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Re-Imagining Justice
Robin West*
What do we mean by legal justice, as opposed to distributive, or social, or
political justice; what is the justice, that is, we hope law promotes? What is the
justice that lawyers and judges, peculiarly, are professionally committed to
pursue? What is the virtue around which, arguably, this profession, and the
individuals within it, have defined their public lives?
Justice-and more particularly legal justice-is a badly under-theorized
topic in jurisprudence; perhaps surprisingly, there is little written on it.1 The
paucity of writing of course has a history. It can be traced to the turn of the last
century--formative years of legal pedagogy and legal curriculum-when legal
formalists and legal realists, who disagreed on virtually everything else
regarding law, oddly enough agreed on the need to sever law from moral
philosophy and more generally from high culture. Formalists, so as to render
law autonomous, deductively pure, "scientific," and resting on its own bottom,
so to speak, and realists, so as to tie law to the prestige, aspirations, and
methods of the then nascent but ascending social sciences. Both realists and
formalists, albeit for different reasons, sought to disassociate law from the
demands of religion, morals, or culture, generally from the Toquevillian
aristocratic norms within which law had been nested in the pre-Classical era.
Justice, the great formalist Christopher Langdell thought, was not a fit subject
of thought for a rigorous and professional and scientific law school
curriculum. 2  Oliver Wendell Holmes, the father of legal realism, quite
famously, was even harsher. "I hate justice," Holmes wrote. "I know that if a
man begins to talk about that, for one reason or another he is shirking thinking
in legal terms." 3  At least in the legal academy, we have indeed taken the
Holmesian admonition to heart. Fearful of appearing sentimental, childish, or,
worst of all, ignorant of the law, twentieth century lawyers and legal scholars,
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1. The best short treatment is David Luban, Legal Justice, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF JURISPRUDENCE
AND LEGAL THEORY (Ist ed., 2001).
2. See generally Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 6-12 (1983)
(describing Langdell's vision of the law school curriculum).
3. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Dr. Wu, in OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: HIS BOOK
NOTICES AND UNCOLLECTED PAPERS 201 (H. Shriver ed., 1936).
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with only a few exceptions,4 have forsook the work of elucidating the concept
of legal justice.
Holmes and Langdellian skepticism notwithstanding, one can quite easily
discern a conventional, and largely uncriticized, turn-of-the-century
understanding of legal justice, inside the academy and the profession. It finds
oratorical expression in law day and graduation day speeches, in the major
unspoken premises of countless conventional legal arguments, and in some,
although again not much, jurisprudential scholarship. That conception--call it
the dominant or conventional conception-I will argue below, is seriously
flawed. More specifically, I want to suggest that it is seriously flawed in a way
that directly and negatively affects feminist and progressive efforts at achieving
political reform. Feminists and progressives need to take up the task of
criticizing our conventional understanding of legal justice. More importantly,
we need to take up the task of crafting alternatives.
Let me begin by specifying what I take the dominant conception to be.
Legal justice-by which I mean here the virtue that specifically informs,
constrains, or guides law, legal practice, and adjudication-consists of (at least)
three separate commitments. First, the justice to which we conventionally
aspire in law consists of a commitment to-and therefore an understanding
of-the "Rule of Law." Lawyers take extraordinary pride in the Rule of Law,
and routinely connect it, in law day speeches or graduation speeches, with the
virtue of legal justice. The case may be different with other sorts of justice, but
legal justice, we might, and often do say, is only possible within a pre-
commitment to the Rule of Law. Put differently, the justice to which we are
committed as lawyers is the justice produced by fidelity to law. So to
understand the virtue of justice, we must understand the point of the Rule of
Law.
Second, legal justice requires adherence to some recognizable regime of
rights. Rights, to borrow from Ronald Dworkin's formulation, are the means
by which justice is secured in law; they are the metaphorical bridge from the
moral ought to the legal imperative.5 Rights-justified by reference to our
moral nature, and then consequentially constraining what the state may or may
not do--are, no less than the rule of law, necessary to legal justice. It may not
always or everywhere be so-other societies, for example, may organize their
institutional commitment to justice around a scheme of duty, or a faith-based
identity-but here and now, in this culture, we achieve justice through
recognizing and then enforcing our rights. To understand legal justice requires
an understanding of the rights to which we are entitled.
4. Richard Posner's identification of legal justice with the maximization of wealth and Ronald
Dworkin's identification of legal justice with integrity are the two prominent exceptions. See generally
RONALD DwORKrN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986); RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1981).
5. See RONALD DWORKIN, Taking Rig/its Seriously, in TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 184-205
(1977).
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Third, and perhaps most obviously, according to the conventional
conception, legal justice requires a commitment to some version of the rule of
precedent-legal justice, for most lawyers, is the moral mandate to treat like
cases alike, nothing more, but more importantly, nothing less. To do legal
justice means, in essence, to decide cases according to rules. To decide cases
according to rules in turn requires that likes be treated alike, and unlikes be
rethought until their similarities with some pre-existing pattern are identified,
and then likewise treated alike. 6  The virtue of legal justice requires a
commitment to this moral mandate.
Each of these commitments-the Rule of Law, rights, and the Rule of
Precedent-obviously requires interpretation. The dominant conception of
legal justice consists not just of the ideals themselves, but also of particular
understandings of the Rule of Law, of the nature of rights, and of precedent.
My critical point, consequently, is this: the conventional understandings or
interpretations of these three jurisprudential ideas-ideas about the nature of
the Rule of Law, the nature of rights, and the nature of the Rule of Precedent-
are not very good interpretations of those three ideals. But, as bad ideas go,
they also have considerable power, particularly in law schools. These days,
they blanket the legal academy. They have force, all the more so for being
relatively unexamined.
Let me take them up in the order laid out above. First, the Rule of Law.
What does it mean to live in a society governed by the Rule of Law? Why do
those who live in one seemingly take such pride in it? It could of course mean
many quite different things-and has meant many different things. The
contemporary, now dominant, interpretation that I want to highlight is only one
possible interpretation among many, but it is one that resonates broadly these
days among law students, perhaps in part because it neatly echoes one presently
popular version of this country's mythological history. On this view, the
purpose of the Rule of Law is to shield both the individual and the community
from the brunt of overly personal, tyrannical, whimsical, brutal, or "naked"
politics. It is the Rule of Law that distinguishes legality from tyranny; the
orderly and benign control of the social behavior of free men by rules from the
whimsical, or worse, command over individuals by unchecked and unduly
personal authority. Legalism-the very idea of law-shields us, in effect, from
the excesses of unadorned political power. Law is power's antidote. Law is
the antithesis of politics; law constrains, counters, and cabins politics. What we
ask of law, on this accounting, what we turn to it to do, is to protect us from the
ambitions of an overweening, zealous, at best unduly paternalistic and at worst
sadistic, but always freedom-sapping, state. We organize authority in lawful
forms so as to emasculate particular power holders or seekers; we establish law
6. See Anthony T. Kronman, Precedent and Tradition, 99 YALE L.J. 1029, 1037 (1990).
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to frustrate the will to power. 7 By so doing, we free individuals to act, and to
act in ways that are unpolluted by power. The underlying psychic parable of
this understanding of law's essential appeal is Freudian: Brothers unite to
overthrow the powerful and personal father and then establish in his place
totemic, rather than personal, authority. 8 The fictional literature spawned in
this century by the appeal of this vision-law as that which vanquishes power,
and power, simply, as that which kills-is immense and known to all of us
from young adulthood. Think, perhaps foremost, of the lawlessness of the
political dictatorship of Oceania in George Orwell's dystopic classic 1984.9
The prominence of this understanding of law's essence-that law and the
Rule of Law is that which protects individual freedom from political
overreach-unites and perhaps partly explains a good deal of contemporary
constitutional law. It provides the unstated major premise of particular
interpretations of quite general constitutional phrases. It is a view of law as the
antithesis of power, for example, that has driven the Court over the last twenty
years to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of "equal protection
of the law" as severely constraining the political power of states from taking
even modest affirmative steps toward eradicating the effects of racism, rather
than as virtually requiring it to do so. A state acting in such an overtly political
way, the Court has reasoned, is a far greater danger to individual freedom than
the private racial stratification that a state so acting might thereby seek to
ameliorate.1° If the "Rule of Law," and hence "Constitutional Law," exists so
as to limit, or mute, or muzzle politics, then surely the point of the Fourteenth
Amendment is to limit, mute, and muzzle political voice. Similarly, and more
specifically, it is this view of the Rule of Law, and its relation to public and
private power, that underlies the view, now widely shared among right wing
political and legal think tanks, the current Supreme Court, and I think most
7. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1180
(1989).
8. SIGMUND FREUD, TOTEM AND TABOO: RESEMBLANCES BETWEEN THE PSYCHIC LIVES OF
SAVAGES AND NEUROTICS (A.A. Brill trans., Vintage Books 1918) (1918).
9. GEORGE ORWELL, 1984 (1949).
10. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 490-92 (1989) (plurality opinion)
(arguing that the city's affirmative action plan for minority-owned construction businesses failed
constitutional strict scrutiny because the city did not demonstrate with enough specificity that the plan
remedied past racial discrimination; thus, the government had no compelling interest in upholding it, and
the plan itself was not sufficiently narrowly tailored). For critical commentary, see Erwin Chemerinsky,
The Supreme Court, 1988 Term-Foreword. The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43, 54-56
(1989); Anthony E. Cook, The Temptation and the Fall of Original Understanding, 1990 DUKE L.J.
1163, 1194-96 (book review); Richard Delgado, Playing Favorites, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1223 (1996);
Charles R. Lawrence, Il, The Epidemiology of Color-Blindness: Learning to Think and Talk About
Race, Again, 15 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 1 (1995); Kathleen M. Sullivan, City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co.: The Backlash Against Affirmative Action, 64 TUL. L. REV. 1609 (1990); Laurence H. Tribe,
Constitutional Scholars' Statement on Affirmative Action After City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 98
YALE L.J. 1711 (1989); Patricia J. Williams, Comment: Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Regrouping in
Singular Times, 104 HARV. L. REV. 525 (1990); Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Future of Affirmative
Action: Reclaiming the Innovative Ideal, 84 CAL. L. REV. 953 (1996).
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ominously, the supposedly liberal editorial page of the Washington Post, that a
substantial part of the Congressional "Violence Against Women Act"
(VAWA), passed in 1994, is unconstitutional." That Act, on this view, is itself
a greater threat to freedom than is the actual, demonstrated unchecked violence
against women that the law seeks to remedy. Thus, VAWA is precisely the sort
of target at which the Constitution is aimed, and the act is accordingly
unconstitutional. It is this reading of the Rule of Law, to take two final
examples, that, at the turn of the last century, regarded the threat to freedom
posed by minimum wage laws as a greater danger to individual freedom than
the threat posed to individual survival by sub-minimum wages, and hence
regarded those laws as unconstitutional. At the turn of this century, proponents
of this same reading regard the greatest threat to free speech as emanating from
innocuous campus and university speech codes, rather than from cross
burnings, gay-bashing, or the vandalizing of menorahs on those same
campuses, or for that matter the control of information by a handful of media
elites, or the control of elections by economic elites. It is, in short, this
understanding of law's essence that drives so many-including the current
Supreme Court-to regard the idea of law itself, and hence the Constitution and
the rights that law guarantees, as inexorably limiting rather than enabling,
guiding or requiring congressional political action. It is this view of the point
of the Rule of Law that posits a Constitution ever sensitive to the threat to
freedom posed by an over-zealous state, and ever willfully blind to the threat to
freedom, security, and community posed first by private fratricide, intimidation
or subordination, and then by a quiet state and muzzled politics, that blithely
acquiesces-or indeed gives aid-to private spheres of humiliation and fear. It
is this view of the Rule of Law that makes this understanding of the
Constitution seem natural, inevitable, and desirable, not just to the political
right, but to a generation now of "apolitical" law students and lawyers.
It is also this view of the Rule of Law that constitutes at this point in our
history a serious threat to progressive politics, and feminist politics in
particular. The "politics" contemplated and paranoically feared by Rule of Law
zealotry is demonized precisely because it is regarded, on this account, as
thoroughly meaningless-necessarily, and essentially so. Politics is Dionysian,
undisciplined, furious, and vengeful-in short, female; law, by contrast, is
Apollonian, orderly, rule-like, rational, merciful, and male. The Rule of Law
embodies the latter so as to constrain the former. A Rule of Law that fears
politics, and that crafts a Constitution to disable politics does so because of the
latter's essential, irredeemable irrationality: Politics, in this view, and the will
to power to which politics gives voice, springs inexorably from a poisoned well
11. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Editorial: States' Business, WASH. POST, May
16, 2000, at A20. But see Peter M. Shane, In Whose Best Interest? Not the States', WASH. POST, May
21, 2000, at 135 (criticizing both the decision and the Post's editorial).
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of emboldened malignancy-think of the Furies, in Aeschylus's Oresteia, and
remember their fate, once Apollo and Athena step in and impose the Rule of
Law.12 Power, hence politics, just is the utterly meaningless thirst to dominate.
This impassioned, irrational, political urge, perhaps, cannot be vanquished, but
its expression and force can be, and it is the role of Law-general, abstract,
Apollonian, pure and apolitical-to do so. Rule of Law idolatry threatens the
development of a feminist politics, because it poses politics itself as the threat
with which law must reckon.
Second: On rights. Central to our now-dominant understanding of the
virtue of legal justice is a particular conception of rights, or rather, a particular
conception of the aspects of human nature protected, through rights, against
unwise state encroachment. On this view, what we do and should protect,
through rights, is the individual's heroic will: It is the individual's freedom to
assert his will in whatever ways that he individually or idiosyncratically
desires, unimpeded by noxious community and communitarian constraints, that
is protected by rights. Thus, what is protected is my right to think, act,
contract, express myself, own property, maintain privacy, amass wealth, and
enjoy my possessions against malign, meddling, or irrational state
infringement. The individual is protected, Constitutionally, against such
infringements of his rights, and he is so protected because of a particular
understanding of who we are: We are individuals whose essential being is best
realized through unencumbered and counter-communitarian acts of
individualistic will. It is that individual, the heroically willful individual, who
is protected through a regime of rights.
This conception of rights, as scores of left-wing rights critics of the past
thirty years have pointed out, is clearly hostile to efforts to address, through
politics, private sphere subordination-whether that subordination occurs along
race, gender or class lines. 3 It is this conception of rights, after all, that was
expressed in the majority decision in Dred Scott,14 protecting the rights of the
slaveowner, no less than in Lochner,I' protecting the rights of freely willing
employers and employees, and likewise in a growing number of articles of the
last five years, bemoaning the constitutional threat to the First Amendment
posed by the protection of women against the hostile atmosphere created by
verbal sexual harassment on the job. 6 More subtly however, although in my
12. AESCHYLUS, THE EUMENIDES 146 (Richmond Lattimore trans., University of Chicago 1953)
(458 B.C.).
13. See, e.g., Mary E. Becker, The Politics of Women's Wrongs and the Bill of "Rights": A
Bicentennial Perspective, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 453 (1992); Morton J. Horwitz, Rights, 23 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REv. 393 (1988); Mark Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REv. 1363 (1984).
14. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
15. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
16. See, e.g., Kingsley R. Browne, An Evolutionary Perspective on Sexual Harassment: Seeking
Roots in Biology Rather Than Ideology, 8 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 5 (1997); Kingsley R. Browne,
Workplace Censorship: A Response to Professor Sangree, 47 RUTGERS L. REv. 579 (1995); Kingsley R.
Browne, Title VII as Censorship: Hostile-Environment Harassment and the First Amendment, 52 OHIO
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view just as important, this particular view of rights is hostile to efforts to use
rights to protect aspects of our being that don't fit the heroically willful mold;
thus, the problem posed for progressive and feminist politics by the right-wing
understanding of rights, and the individual protected through them, is not just
the occasional head-to-head conflict between individual rights so understood,
and political antisubordinationist needs. The further damage is the neglect of
other aspects of our natures which might be in need of rights.
To take an example: The dominant conception of rights stands as a serious
obstacle to the nascent feminist efforts now underway by a number of feminist
legal theorists, such as Martha Fineman, 17 some journalists, such as Deborah
Stone, 18 some moral philosophers, including Eva Kittay,' 9 and some liberal
theorists, such as Linda McClain,2 ° to construct meaningful and enforceable
"rights of care," by which I mean rights that might aim to protect female or
male caregivers against the vulnerabilities they sustain when engaged in
caregiving labor in the private sphere. Rights of care, as envisioned by these
thinkers, if we had them or if they were recognized, might protect caregivers
against unwise state action, such as the Personal Responsibility and Work
21Opportunity Reconciliation Act, or entitle caregivers to state support, such as
through a more ambitious Family and Medical Leave Act.22 Obviously, we
don't presently have such rights, and even imagining such rights will no doubt
prove to be arduous labor. One reason (among others) for the difficulty, is
squarely ideological: The "rights of care" that are needed by caregivers are
needed not so much to protect individualistic, heroic, independent acts of will.
Rather, they are needed to protect vulnerabilities brought on by our
relationality, our mutual dependency, and our interdependency. And they are
justified, in turn, not by the liberation of industry, genius, invention, or artistry
faciliated by the unencumbered individual heroic will, but rather, by the
ST. L.J. 481 (1991); Jules B. Gerard, The First Amendment in a Hostile Environment: A Primer on Free
Speech and Sexual Harassment, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1003 (1993); Eugene Volokh, What Speech
Does "Hostile Work Environment" Harassment Law Restrict? 86 GEO. L.J. 627 (1997); Eugene
Volokh, Debate: Thinking Ahead About Freedom of Speech and Hostile Work Environment Harassment,
17 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 305 (1996); Eugene Volokh, Comment: Freedom of Speech and
Workplace Harassment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1791 (1992). See generally Nadine Strossen, The Tensions
Between Regulating Workplace Harassment and the First Amendment: No Trump, 71 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 701 (1995).
17. MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY, AND OTHER
TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995).
18. Deborah Stone, Why We Need a Care Movement, THE NATION, Mar. 13, 2000, at 13.
19. EVA FEDER KITTAY, LOVE'S LABOR: ESSAYS ON WOMEN, EQUALITY, AND DEPENDENCY
(1998).
20. Linda McClain, Care as a Public Value: Linking Responsibility, Resources, and
Republicanism, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1673 (2001).
21. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C., 8 U.S.C., 21 U.S.C., 25
U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.).
22. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 5 U.S.C., and 29 U.S.C.).
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nurtured, healthful maturation and care that such labor ensures. But these
hypothesized rights, perhaps needless to say, ill-fit our liberal understandings.
We have rights, on the dominant view, to be free of obligation, of duty, and of
dependency, and we have those rights because we are, essentially, creatures
whose essence is best expressed not through relational acts of care that nurture
and protect vulnerable others, but rather, through robust acts of independence,
of defiance, and of individualistic trailblazing-acts that defy, not cement, our
essential connections with others.
Third, our dominant understanding of legal justice is constituted by a
particular understanding of the moral mandate, felt at some level by all actors
in the judicial system, of horizontal equity: the imperative to "treat likes alike,"
or to follow precedent, or to comply with stare decisis. What is behind this
mandate? The dominant conception has embraced two of the salient
possibilities: first, we might insist on legal justice-on treating like cases
alike-because we view such a mandate as an important bridge to the past: as a
way of maintaining faith with ancestral wisdom, as a way of preserving
traditions, as a way of forging a commonality between who we are as a
community and who we have been as a community.2 3 Second, we might insist
on legal justice-on treating like cases alike-because such consistency and
predictability is essential to the end of maximizing human liberty: By knowing
with some certainty what and when the legal leviathan will impose itself upon
me I can more freely order my own affairs, and the rule of precedent, or stare
24decisis, or the mandate to treat likes alike, furthers that certainty. Thus, legal
justice, as we presently understand it, serves the ends of traditionalism (or
social conservatism) and libertarianism (or economic conservatism) quite
nicely.
This understanding of formal, or horizontal, equity is also an obstacle to
specifically feminist visions of politics and political reform. To combat
subordination, there must be a breach, not relentless continuity, with our bonds
to the past-at which time subordination was entrenched, and entrenched in the
very traditions that legal justice and stare decisis so vigorously promote. And
to either combat subordination or protect the work of caregiving, we must from
time to time interfere with, rather than relentlessly honor, the liberty that comes
from our certainty regarding the legal leviathan. A conception of legal justice
that seeks to further either traditional patterns of social life or libertarian
understandings of human well-being will not be well suited to the ends or
means of progressive political visions. There will emerge, then, if these
conceptions go unchallenged, a quite deep antithesis between the conservative
idea of law, as reflected in understandings of formal justice, and the very idea
of progressive political reform.
23. Kronman, supra note 6.
24. Id. at 1037-39.
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These ideas-ideas centering on the meaning of the Rule of Law, the
content and purpose of our rights, and the moral mandate of horizontal
equity-constitute the dominant conception of the virtue of legal justice. They,
or something like them, dominate law day speeches and commencement
addresses. But they are more than ornamental. They also undergird large
chunks of constitutional argument-the Constitution is our highest Law, and
the point of Law is to constrain and tame politics, and politics is what
sovereigns produce-thus the point of the Constitution is to forbid certain
outcomes by the political branches. The Constitution exists so as to frustrate
rather than facilitate political solutions to social problems. They are also, all
three of them, full of contradictions, enough contradictions to absorb the
attention and energies of several generations of energetic deconstructionists.
At the same time, however, they should not be undersold. They are, first, ideas.
They are not simply preferences, stakes, or political parries. They have been a
long time in the making; they have a lineage. They have an internal coherence,
contradictions notwithstanding. They also, importantly, resonate with our
mythological national history. They speak to the fears we have, rightly or
wrongly, of over-bearing paternalism, communism, imperialism, states-run-
amok, children or madmen or fundamentalist zealots or sadists at the helm of
state. They also echo our dreams, and hopes, ill-placed or not, of unfettered
liberty, of freedom being, happily, just another word for nothing left to lose, of
breaking away, to borrow from the title of Lina Wertmuller's famous film, of
our imagined essence being a function of the mark we each heroically and quite
individually leave on our world.
To summarize: This ideological tripod-an interpretation of the Rule of
Law, an understanding of Rights, and an explanation of the moral mandate of
formal equality-constitutes a widely shared understanding of Legal Justice,
which is both facially apolitical (these are ideas about law, after all, not about
politics) but which also render natural, or neutral, legal conclusions that are
inimical to a feminist or progressive politics. What to do about it? There are
three options. One is to demonstrate the politics behind the claim of political
neutrality. This has been the idle fixe of the critical legal studies movement
now for over thirty years, and to make a long story short, not much has come of
it. The second possibility is to point out the arguably central contradictions
behind each leg of the tripod. A good bit of feminist and critical and left
scholarship has gone into this project: The understanding of the Rule of Law
recited above rests on a glaring and illogical leap of faith from the fact of a
written word to the ghostlike dream of a government of laws rather than
persons; the idea of a right as essentially a negative protection against state
intervention into the private is belied by the existence of the criminal law itself,
which positively protects us-although some more than others-against private
maldistributions of physical power; and the mandate to treat likes alike is so
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thoroughly riddled with exceptions, given the need to accommodate history and
difference both, that it is problematized by virtually all serious doctrinal as well
as theoretical legal scholarship of almost all stripes. There is, though, a third
possible critical response, and that is to re-imagine.
We need a progressive jurisprudence-a jurisprudence that embraces rather
than resists, and then re-interprets, our liberal commitment to the "rule of law,"
the content of our individual rights, and the dream of formal equality. More
inclusive interpretations-more generous re-imaginings--could then undergird,
and in a principled way, particular constitutional arguments. Rather than
relentlessly buck, deconstruct, or vilify the seeming "naturalness" of legal
arguments premised on moral premises, we ought to be providing such
premises, and natural and general arguments of our own. But first we need to
re-imagine.
Let me suggest some possible contrasts, starting with the Rule of Law.
Contrast the understanding of the Rule of Law suggested above-in which the
point of law is to frustrate, mute, muffle, politics-with a second and quite
different understanding of both law's promise and the evil at which it is
directed. On this alternative conception, the point or essence of law is to
construct, rather than frustrate, the realm of politics. It is to nurture rather than
stifle a public sphere within which our political natures find expression. The
horror of lawlessness, on this view, finds dystopic expression not in the
totalitarian imaginings of Orwell, but rather, in the equally parabolic young-
25adult masterpiece Lord of the Flies. In Golding's dystopic vision, recall, it is
the absence of a political state-not an all-too-powerful one-that gives rise to
the domination of some and the subordination of others through fratricidal and
infantile violence. The fear we counter with the hope of law, on this view, is
not our fear of an overly powerful state, but rather, our fear of an impotent,
absent, emasculated, or neglectful state, and the tribal, fraternal, or inter-
familial warfare to which the absence of political authority would give rise. Put
positively, the utopian alternative to fratricide that we attempt to construct
through law, is not so much the unleashing of free individual choice unfettered
by an oppressive state, but the necessary conditions of cooperative community
life. Law, and the point of the Rule of Law, on this view, is not to frustrate
politics, but to enable it. And politics, on this view, is not the dictatorial or
totalitarian Orwellian nightmare, or the lethal war of all against all, but rather
the antithesis of both; it is the means by which communities and individuals
create meaning.
If that is the point of law, then it is also in some way the point of the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause to guarantee not only
equality, but also equal protection of the law. If that's right, then the Rule of
Law so understood points unequivocally toward the constitutionality, indeed
25. WILLIAM GOLDING, LORD OF THE FLIES (1954).
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the constitutional necessity, of the Violence Against Women Act, as well as the
Brady Bill, as well as other forms of gun legislation. If the point of law is to
police against private violence, as Thomas Hobbes urged some time ago,26 then
the Constitution, and surely the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause, must exist in part to ensure that this protection against violence is
granted equally. If that is right, then the constitutionality of VAWA, I think,
follows inexorably. And-it is right. It is the basic point of law, and hence of
the Rule of Law, to police against private violence. Hobbes had that exactly
right. And it is most assuredly the point of the Fourteenth Amendment's equal
protection clause, to ensure that protection is granted equally.
Likewise, rather than abandoning rights-throwing the baby out with the
bathwater-we need to rethink, jurisprudentially, the understanding of who we
are and what we are that underlies the dominant understandings of rights. We
are not only beings whose essence is realized through heroic acts of
independent will. We are also parents and grandparents and children of parents
and grandparents whose essence is realized through acts of care that protect
those dependent upon us and give meanings to our lives by virtue of so doing.
Those caring acts that emanate from us and that are bestowed upon us are not
only necessary for our individual and collective survival, but they are also the
soil in which our moral and most human selves are rooted. They are also,
developmentally, essential conditions for the flowering of the individualist
spirit so celebrated by both liberal and right wing jurists, and fitfully protected
by liberal rights. Perhaps we do, as liberal and libertarian philosophers and
jurists of the last five hundred years have urged, need rights to protect our
individuality-to protect our freedoms of thought, speech, religion, property,
and contract. No less vitally, however, we need rights that we currently lack:
We need rights that protect our ability and will to care for the weak among us,
and to nurture them to health, and to care for the young, and bring them to
responsible maturity, and to comfort and care for the elderly and ease the
burdens of age. We need such rights of care not only, and not even primarily,
to protect those activities against an overweening state. We need those rights to
valorize and honor this fundamental aspect of our being. We need such rights
so as to goad to action-not inaction-community and state support for those
essential and essentially interdependent spheres of social life.
And finally, we need to re-imagine the point of the mandate of legal
justice. The "moral point" of the mandate to treat likes alike, much authority to
the contrary notwithstanding, may be, at heart, neither to protect tradition nor
liberty. The point of treating likes alike may rather be rooted in a universalist
and humanistic inclination to define the human community broadly-to
envision a community that includes all, and includes all because of a
recognition of shared humanity. This cosmopolitan vision of the mandate of
26. THOMAS HOBBES, THE LEVIATHAN 120-21, 153-54 (Richard Tuck ed., 1996) (1651).
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legal justice as well, of course, has difficulties, both conceptual and moral, but
it is nevertheless one which would not be at heart hostile to feminist and
progressive aspirations. It would strive for and stress both inclusiveness and
respect for difference. It would seek a large rather than constrained
community; its impulse is toward a global as well as local acknowledgement of
duty and responsibility. If accepted, it would align law, the idea of law, and the
idea of legal justice, not with the traditions of the best or the economic liberty
of individual and corporations, but rather, with the hopes for a community of
world citizens. It would align law, legal justice, lawyers, and lawyering
professionally, with a recognition that the universal human rights of women, as
of all, are grounded in a shared humanity and ultimately a shared fate. It would
align the idea of law and the ideals of law with the feminist politics of the
greatest moment, the struggle to secure basic rights for those women both here
and abroad who lack them, because they are regarded as both different from
and less than some shared human essence.27
To summarize, in my view, our dominant conception of the virtue of legal
justice has at its core a set of ideas: particular interpretive understandings of the
point of the Rule of Law, the nature of rights, and the meaning of precedent.
They are not very good ideas. They are full of contradictions and they are
ungenerous in the extreme. But we ignore them at our peril. Ideas do matter,
to repeat a clich6, and bad ideas will win out, if there is no counter. There
presently isn't much of one. We need and don't have a progressive
jurisprudence-a conception of the point of the Rule of Law, of Rights, and of
formal or legal justice-that is respectful of the needs, ambitions, aspirations
and-yes-the natures of heretofore not terribly well-respected women,
children, animals and men. We don't have such a conception, and we don't
have it, in part, because we have grown distrustful of the project: distrustful of
the ideals of the Rule of Law, of the punishing and anti-womanist hidden
implications in the idea of rights, of the not so well-hidden dangers in a
backward looking and backward regarding understanding of legal justice. But
we have lived without a conception of justice for long enough now to see the
damage that skepticism has wrought. We need to not only deconstruct so as to
expose the hidden politics of dominant conceptions of justice; we need to
construct or re-imagine alternatives with care.
27. I argue this at greater length in Robin West, Is the Rule of Law Cosmopolitan?, 19 QUINNIPIAC
L. REv. 259 (2000).
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